During the last 50 years, comparative cognition and neurosciences have improved our 18 understanding of animal minds while evolutionary ecology has revealed how selection acts on 19 traits through evolutionary time. We describe how this evolutionary approach can be used to 20 understand the evolution of animal cognition. We recount how comparative and fitness methods 21 have been used to understand the evolution of cognition and outline how these methods could be 22
extended to gain new insights into cognitive evolution. The fitness approach, in particular, offers 23 unprecedented opportunities to study the evolutionary mechanisms responsible for variation in 24 cognition within species and could allow us to investigate both proximate (ie: neural and 25 developmental) and ultimate (ie: ecological and evolutionary) underpinnings of animal cognition 26 together. Our goal in this review is to build a bridge between cognitive neuroscientist and 27 evolutionary biologists, illustrate how their research could be complementary, and encourage 28 evolutionary ecologists to include explicit attention to cognitive processes in their studies of 29 behaviour. We believe that in doing so, we can break new ground in our understanding of the 30 evolution of cognition as well as gain a much better understanding of animal behaviour. 31
Introduction 35
Niko Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963) proposed that biologists should try to understand animal 36 behaviours in the light of two different and complimentary perspectives: the proximate and 37 ultimate (see Bateson and Laland, 2013; Laland et al., 2011 for recent updates). While both 38 approaches have been employed in the study of animal cognition, most studies have done so 39 independently with little integration across fields. After some promising, integrative studies in 40 the 1980s and 1990s (see Kamil, 1998 for a review), the last decades have seen the establishment 41 of entirely independent lines of research with only a few notable exceptions. We now have a 42 deeper understanding of how animal minds work, but we know very little about the evolution of 43 or ecological pressures that shape cognition. Consequently, we know very little about what role 44 cognition, a collection of highly plastic and flexible traits, plays in adaptation and biological 45 evolution. We believe the time is ripe for evolutionary ecology studies to explicitly integrate 46 cognition to generate a much stronger understanding of how the mind evolves. 47 many. Decision-making is the process enabling an individual to compare mental representations 65 and choose the most appropriate given the environmental context. Finally, executive functions 66 (reasoning, problem solving, flexibility, categorization etc…) enable an individual to perform 67 operations and manipulations of mental representations. Cognition is also sometimes divided 68 according to the nature of the representation; one can for instance talk about spatial or social 69 cognition. 70
71
The association between studies in psychology and neurosciences along with the advent of 72 powerful new neuroimaging technics (e.g. In vivo electrophysiology, Magnetic Resonance 73 Imaging (MRI), Positron emission Tomography (PET), optogenetic etc.) has lead us to better 74 understand how behaviours and decisions are linked to neural structures and neural activity in 75 several animal species including humans. Despite this in depth understanding, much less 76 progress has been made in understanding the evolutionary processes that have lead to the 77 patterns of cognition that we see. 78
79 Ultimate approaches focus on the evolutionary history of behaviours or traits and the selective 80 pressures that favour the evolution of those traits. Those using this approach have focused on 81 behaviours with only a few rare studies examining cognition per se (e.g. Bond and Kamil, 2002, 82 2006; Lyon, 2003; Théry and Casas, 2002) . Evolutionary biologists and behavioural ecologists 83 have been primarily interested in the ecology and evolution of behaviour without examining the 84 cognitive mechanisms underlying these behaviours. What ecological or social contexts are 85 responsible for the evolution of a specific behaviour? What role does evolutionary history 86 (inheritance from a common ancestor) play in the evolution of that trait? What are the costs and 87 benefits of behaviours and what do they imply for selection on the animal's life history strategy? 88
To answer these questions behavioural ecologists have adopted the Neo-Darwinian theoretical 89 framework and developed tools and models to understand the extreme variability of behaviours 90 within and among species. However, this approach focuses on the aggregate outcome of 91 cognition and action (i.e. the behaviour) and has usually considered the animal mind as a black 92 box (Giraldeau, 2004) . Indeed, much of behavioral or evolutionary ecology theory is based on 93 strategic decision-making. While in some cases these strategic decisions reflect physiological 94 trade-offs, many more cases reflect decisions made probably on the basis of processing external 95 information gathered by an individual. Attention in such studies is placed on the quality of 96 information and the outcome of a decision, but there is little understanding of how information is 97 processed and how cognitive abilities enhance or constrain decisions based on the available 98 information (Rowe, 1999 (Rowe, , 2013 . For example, social behavior, individual recognition, mate 99 choice, parental care, dispersal, foraging, and predator avoidance nearly always rely on gathering 100 external information. How well an individual gathers that information, how well it remembers 101 that information, and how it integrates different sources of information all depend on cognitive 102 capacities. To illustrate this notion ( Figure 1 ) we can imagine a female who must choose the best 103 mate among males that each display a number of ornaments linked to various qualities (e.g. good 104
genes, parental care, nest defense, etc…). How does a female integrate the information provided 105 in each of the male's sexual signals with information about the external ecological environment 106 (e.g. are there many nest predators)? As the female comparison shops for the best male, how 107 many of the males can she remember? If she chooses to return to the second male she saw, will 108 she remember where he is and will she recognize him? This example illustrates just some of the 109 cognitive processes related to one behavior that would have fundamental consequences for 110 sexual selection theory. Many other behaviors and life history strategies will similarly depend on 111 cognitive capacities and actual measurement of cognitive abilities has the potential to 112 fundamentally alter our views of behavior. 113
114
Understanding the evolutionary and ecological significance of cognition has been a major 115 challenge in biology as highlighted in several recent books ( and has led to a new field of research called 119 cognitive ecology. We argue that two factors will help to significantly advance our understanding 120 of animal cognition: 1) proximate and ultimate studies should develop lines of research that 121 allow direct integration of the two fields and 2) that evolutionary studies begin to apply their 122 research methods to cognition per se along with the behaviours that result from cognitive 123 processes. In doing so, we will gain a better understanding of how cognitive systems evolve and 124 how cognitive structures and function relate to the problems they evolved to solve. 125
126
In this review, we focus more on the contribution that evolutionary biology can offer cognitive 127 research since much less work has been done in this domain. Despite this bias towards what 128 evolutionary biologists could contribute (i.e. what we know less about), we also highlight new 129 contributions that cognitive neuroscientists could make to better integrate proximate and ultimate 130 understandings of cognition. In the first section, we review past work testing popular hypotheses 131 for cognitive evolution using comparative methods and highlight future directions to exploit 132 using these methods. We then illustrate how measuring selection on cognition within a species 133 provides a great opportunity to better understand the evolution of cognition and create direct 134 links with proximate studies of cognition (e.g. neurosciences, cognitive-psychology). We finish 135 by presenting two lines of research as case studies-food hoarding and brood parasitism-that, Current tests of factors that influence the evolution of the brain have largely relied on 141 comparative methods. The phylogenetic comparative approach (Felsenstein, 1985 (Felsenstein, , 2008 ; 142 or ecological) are associated with the evolution of a trait (e.g. brain size), if that trait evolves 147 directionally, how much common ancestry constrains evolution, and how the evolution of a trait 148 influences speciation rates. 149
150
The three major hypotheses of neurocognitive evolution that have been proposed focus on 151 identifying primary factors that have driven differences in brain size and cognitive function 152 across species. The first set of hypotheses suggest that cognition has evolved due to the value of 153 ecological intelligence; the ability to find and extract food (Byrne, 1997; Parker and Gibson, 154 1977) , manage high spatiotemporal variation in food resources (Sol et al., 2005) , or manage and 155 defend large territories (Clutton-Brock and . The second set of hypotheses propose 156 that cognition has evolved primarily due to its value in social intelligence; the ability to negotiate and succeed through dominance in large groups (Dunbar, 1998; Whiten and Byrne, 1988) or 158 alternatively the ability to manage positive relationships and social partnerships (Dunbar and 159 Shultz, 2007, 2010; Emery et al., 2007) . The third hypothesis, recently proposed to reconcile 160 ecological and social drivers, suggests that cognition evolved to buffer individuals against 161 environmental challenges by producing appropriate behavioural responses in new socio-162 ecological contexts (Allman and Hasenstaub, 1999; Deaner et al., 2003; Sol, 2009) . 163
Each of these hypotheses has been tested using comparative methods and each has found some 164 support. For example, brain size depends on diet in mammals (Eisenberg and Wilson, 1978 ; Likewise, brain size and neocortex size are related to social group size (Barton and Dunbar, 167 1997; Dunbar, 1998; Dunbar and Bever, 1998; Gittleman, 1986; Marino, 1996) and other metrics 168 of social group structure in mammals (reviewed in Dunbar and Shultz, 2007) suggesting that 169 social drivers are also important to the evolution of the brain and cognition. Interestingly, 170 comparison of ecological and social factors in ungulates, showed that relative brain size is 171 influenced by social and ecological factors while relative neocortex size is only influenced by 172 sociality (Shultz and Dunbar, 2006) . Finally, species with larger brains have been shown to 173 survive better in novel environments (Sol et al., 2005 (Sol et al., , 2007 (Sol et al., , 2008 in support to the cognitive 174 buffer hypothesis (Sol, 2009) . 175
Comparative studies focused on brain size have also been largely criticised (Healy and Rowe, invertebrates, such as bees and ants, suggests that high cognitive capabilities do not require large 178 overall brain size (Chittka and Niven, 2009 ). Measurements of brain size or brain structure 179 volumes are too coarse grained given that current neuroscience methods enable us to study fine 180 scale brain organisation and function (Healy and Rowe, 2007; Roth et al., 2010a) . For instance, 181 cognitive neurosciences have revealed different brain networks and mechanism associated with 182 different cognitive abilities. Thus, instead of studying whole brain or neocortex size, comparative 183 studies should focus on neural circuits and functioning that are known to be involved in the 184 cognitive mechanism of interest when possible (Lihoreau et al., 2012) . 185
186
Efforts to address the problem that brain size may not be the same as cognitive abilities have 187 been made along two lines of comparative research: (i) spontaneous records of cognition-based 188 behaviours (e.g. innovation) in the wild and (ii) comparative psychology experiments in the lab. 189
The first line of research, also called 'taxonomical counts of cognition in the wild' (reviewed in 190
Lefebvre, 2011), enables the study of large samples of "spontaneous" behaviour occurring in the 191 selective environment or at least a natural or semi-natural habitat. This approach has confirmed 192 that relative brain size increases with increased tool use and frequency of innovation in birds 193 social learning in primates (Reader and Laland, 2002) , or deception in primates (Byrne, 2004) . performances of 36 animal species (from birds to rodents to apes) in two problem solving tasks 213 measuring self-control. Their results suggest that the major proximate mechanism underlying the 214 evolution of self control is the absolute brain volume rather than residual brain volume corrected 215 for body mass. They also report a significant relationship between cognitive performance and 216 dietary breadth but not social organization in primates. Thus, this massive comparative cognition 217 study challenges both the proxy of cognition (relative brain size) and the hypothesis (social brain 218 hypothesis) tested in many brain comparative studies and illustrates the danger of over 219 interpreting comparative cognition studies. Continued efforts to link specific cognitive functions 220 to their ecological and social settings present a promising avenue to understand the evolution of 2012 for a review). For example, comparative methods can be used to examine the sequence of 232 events in coevolution such that we could ask if the increase of a cognitive ability generally 233 precedes or succeeds specific social or ecological changes. Likewise, we could examine the 234 relative rates of evolution during the increase or decrease of a particular cognitive ability. Finally, 235
we can ask how shifts in cognition are associated with the speciation process itself (e.g. 236 Nicolakakis et al., 2003) . Does the evolution of increased cognitive ability facilitate speciation? 237 238
Intraspecific selection on neurocognitive traits: the fitness approach 239
Measuring contemporary selection has proved a powerful approach to understanding the 240 evolution of traits and this method could be readily applied to the evolution of cognition. The 241 basic premise of this 'fitness' approach follows Darwin's theory of evolution (1859) which 242 suggests that short term selection is the primary cause of evolutionary change and speciation. 243 There are two distinct advantages to the fitness method relative to the comparative method for 251 studying neurocognitive evolution. The first advantage is that studies of selection measure fitness 252 costs and benefits of specific traits which can provide a close match with measurements of 253 cognitive abilities and brain mechanisms currently studied in animal cognition and neurosciences 254 ( Figure 2 ). Thus the fitness approach provides opportunities to integrate our proximate 255 understanding of cognition with new findings on the ultimate causes of cognitive evolution. The 256 second advantage is that examination of selection ideally includes identification of the agent of 257 selection or the specific social or ecological challenges that favour a specific trait. Adopting this 258 approach helps us acknowledge that there may be multiple factors that select for a given 259 cognitive ability and that each species will require only a subset of all cognitive skills given their 260 environment. 261
262
To show that animal cognition evolves under direct natural or social selection requires that the 263 three necessary conditions for selection and evolution that Darwin (1859, 1871) outlined apply to 264 cognitive abilities (Dukas, 2004) . Traits, or in this case cognitive abilities, will evolve if (1) there 265 is variability in cognition between individuals, (2) that this variability in cognitive ability is 266 heritable, and (3) that this variation is related to variance in fitness (survival, reproductive 267 success) under specific environmental conditions. Few studies have tackled these questions 268 specifically, but evidence from the literature supports the notion that cognition should evolve 269 under selection making the fitness approach fruitful. Heritability of traits is difficult to measure since many non-genetic effects (common environment, 296 parental care, maternal effects, etc…) contribute to resemblance between parents and offspring. 297 generations. Artificial selection of brain size in guppies (Poecilia reticulata) also suggests 307 heritability of brain size (Kotrschal et al., 2013a) with a divergence in relative brain size of 9% 308 between lines selected for large vs. small size over just two generations. Interestingly, large-309 brained females outperformed small-brained females in a numerical learning test, which also 310 provides evidence for an association between increased brain size and higher cognition. These 311 results should be treated cautiously since disentangling true heritability from plasticity would 312 require more than 2 generations and a relaxation of selection to see if brain size differences 313 persist (see Healy The first studies of the evolutionary and ecological significance of spatial memory employed the 372 comparative framework, with the prediction that scatter food hoarding species should surpass 373 non-hoarding species in spatial memory tasks and should have a relatively bigger hippocampus. 374
However, results from these early studies were equivocal and difficult to interpret. The 375 superiority of spatial capabilities in hoarding species was not always clear (reviewed in Healy et 376 al., 2009 ). Furthermore, and more concerning, the comparative approach suffers from a number 377 of confounding factors, such as morphological differences between species, that could never 378 clearly be separated from performance in cognitive tasks (but see (Kamil, 1998) for methods). 379
380
Problems with comparative analyses have been very elegantly solved by focusing on intra-381 specific variation in a number of landmark studies comparing populations exposed to different 382 ecological contexts. In one of the earliest of such studies, Pravosudov and Clayton (2002) 383 demonstrated that black-capped chickadees (Poecile atricapilla) living in harsh winter climates 384 (i.e. Alaska) cache more food, have higher spatial memory capabilities, and have a larger 385 hippocampus that contains more neurones than individuals of the same species in populations 386 from milder climates (i.e. Colorado). While the appearance of adaptation is clear, such 387 differences could reflect either local adaptation shaped by natural selection or result from 388 plasticity in brain structure and behaviour generated from the local environment. The persistence 389 of among population differences in brain structure and caching behaviour in common garden 390 experiments, during which 10 days-old chicks from these different populations were hand-raised 391 in identical environmental conditions, strongly argues for a role of natural selection in shaping 392 local adaptation for spatial memory, neural density, and neurogenesis in the hippocampus (Roth 393 et al., 2010b (Roth 393 et al., , 2012 . 394
395
Recent analyses using this within species comparative approach in this and other species have 396 further pushed our understanding of the links between cognition and evolutionary ecology and 397 between proximate and ultimate understandings of cognitive evolution. Research in mountain 398 chickadees (Poecile gambeli) along an altitudinal gradient has shown similar patterns of 399 differentiation in food storage, spatial memory, and hippocampal characteristics as with 400 contrasted populations in the black-capped chickadee (Freas et al., 2013) . Other studies have 401 extended this work on spatial memory differences across populations in caching behaviour to 402 differences between behavioural strategies within a population (LaDage et al., 2013). In side-403 blotched lizards (Uta stansburiana), males adopt one of three different mating strategies that rely 404 to different degrees on spatial memory for territory defence and the distribution of available 405 females across territories. Accordingly, characteristics of the dorsal cortex and hippocampus 406
show differences among genetically determined alternative male strategies within a population 407 and benefits to each player of the host-parasite arms race-often linked to recognition of 425 parasites (Davies, 2011; Lyon and Eadie, 2008) . A parasite's fitness is so intricately tied to 426 acceptance by hosts that they must adapt to new host defences either by identifying and changing 427 to a new host or surpassing host defences. Hosts, on the other hand, pay a cost of parasitism, but 428 the evolution of new defences (often a cognitive ability) must be balanced against the frequency 429 of parasitism and the costs of producing better defences (Davies and Brooke, 1988 , 1989a , 430 1989b Lotem, 1993; Lotem et al., 1995; Rothstein, 1982) . Costs of new defences include 431 developing the cognitive or morphological structures for new defences as well as the added risk 432 of expressing those defences (e.g. rejecting own eggs), and these costs influence the evolution of 433 recognition abilities. Plasticity in host recognition reveals the importance that making an 434 incorrect choice can have for the evolution of egg rejection. For example, some common cuckoo 435 hosts avoid rejecting their own eggs (recognition error) when parasites are not present by only 436 increasing rejection rates when adult cuckoos are seen in the vicinity of the nest (Davies and 437
Brooke 1988). In South American coots, intraspecific parasitism leads to egg rejection, but an 438 interspecific parasite , the blackheaded duck, that imposes no parental care costs is only rejected 439 when ecological conditions render incubation more costly (Lyon and Eadie, 2004) . Globally, 440 studies of avian brood parasites have provided an excellent understanding of the selective 441 environment generated by host-parasite interactions that influences the evolution of recognition 442 and rejection of eggs. 443 444 Mimicry-recognition-rejection arms races reveal the link between cognitive abilities and the 445 evolutionary dynamics of host-parasite systems. Arms races in avian brood parasites related to 446 egg mimicry push host recognition systems to identify parasites while avoiding recognition 447 errors (Davies and Brooke, 1988; Rothstein, 1982) . The accuracy of identifying a mimetic egg 448 depends on visual discrimination abilities and recent studies have begun to specifically integrate 449 this process using 'visual modelling'-information on cone sensitivity and objective measures of 450 egg colour patterns-to understand rejection behaviour, or the lack thereof, in some species 451 Brooke, 1988), or counting the number of eggs laid (Lyon, 2003) have all been shown as means 456 to improve the decision to reject parasite eggs. Use of multiple and disparate cues to improve the 457 accuracy of rejection behaviour would require executive functions to weigh these different 458 criteria in a rejection decision and future research could examine this cognitive ability. Not all 459 host species reject eggs or chicks, which implies that physiological or cognitive limitations may 460 also influence the detection of a parasitic egg (Davies and Brooke, 1988; Lotem, 1993; Lotem et 461 al., 1995; Rodríguez-Gironés and Lotem, 1999; Rothstein, 1982) . 462
463
An understanding of the cognitive mechanisms underlying rejection have also played an 464 important role in understanding why despite close visual mimicry in eggs, nestlings are rarely 465 mimetic. One hypothesis is that unlike egg recognition where comparisons between multiple host 466 eggs and a single parasitic egg makes discrimination possible, having only a single parasite chick 467 in the nest (e.g. common cuckoos) could have severe long term fitness costs if birds learn the 468 appearance of their chicks (Lotem, 1993) . Indeed, learning does seem to play a role in 469 identification and discrimination of eggs (Rothstein, 1974 (Rothstein, , 1978 hatch order and soft rejection (e.g. lower feeding) to help identify parasitic chicks while reducing 473 the risk of mis-imprinting Lyon, 2010, 2011) . These models and empirical results 474
show that the cognitive mechanisms underlying how a species is able to recognize its eggs and 475 chicks plays an important role in the evolution of the host-parasite arms race. 476
477
Finally, a few studies have also begun to investigate the link between neurophysiology and the 478 ecology of brood parasites. Initial studies focused primarily on whole brain size or hippocampus 479 size in brood parasites and their non-parasitic relatives since each species should face different 480 ecological imperatives. Generally, whole brain size tends to be smaller in brood-parasites than 481 their closest relatives (Corfield et al., 2013; Iwaniuk, 2004; Overington, 2011) , which could be 482 linked to less complex cognitive function needed in the absence of parental care in brood 483 parasites (Boerner and Krüger, 2008 Reboreda et al., 1996) . Furthermore, recent analysis has uncovered a specific region 489 of the hippocampus that is enlarged in parasitic species relative to others (Nair-Roberts et al., 490 2006), suggesting brain regions may have evolved to manage the specific needs of brood 491 parasites relative to other spatial memory. These studies provide a rare example of direct linkage 492 between ecology and neurophysiology on a well understood fitness landscape. An exciting next 493 step in such systems could be to examine variation in neural structure with variation in the ability 494 of different hosts -either across or within a species -to reject parasitic eggs or chicks. 495
496
The above studies provide some of the best examples of how discrimination ability links with 497 cognitive decision making under natural ecological conditions. While many of these host-498 parasite studies have not specifically been framed in terms of cognitive ecology, the focus on 499 discrimination, recognition, learning, and decision making are all clearly linked to cognition and 500 could further link to both specific cognitive abilities studied in other organisms and to 501 neurophysiological studies. Together with the strong understanding of the fitness costs and 502 benefits of host-parasite coevolution, these systems provide an excellent opportunity to link 503 cognition, neurophysiology, and evolutionary biology. 504 505
Conclusion 506
We have highlighted two ways to investigate the evolution of cognitive processes in animals: the 507 comparative approach focuses on evolutionary history while the fitness approach examines 508 contemporary selection. Much of our knowledge on the evolution of cognition comes from the 509 comparative approach and the full application of recently developed phylogenetic tools should 510 allow for interesting new results in this line of research. However, since cognition presents all 511 the characteristics of traits under selection (variation, heritability and fitness benefits), we believe 512 that taking the fitness approach to cognitive function will allow us to better explore the 513 evolutionary mechanisms that shape animal minds. Furthermore, the fitness approach more 514 easily allows us to integrate proximate and ultimate factors underlying animal cognition in a 515 single study, as suggested fifty years ago by Tinbergen (Tinbergen, 1963) . 516 517
4-Future directions 518
The integration of evolutionary biology with cognitive sciences provides a very promising 519 avenue of research that could revolutionize our understanding of animal mind. Here we 520 highlighted how methods and new research questions in evolutionary biology could contribute to 521 our current understanding of the proximate basis of cognition. We believe the (unranked) top 522 priorities for the future are: 523 1) Identify cognitive functions that are crucial for species currently studied by evolutionary 524 ecologists and behavioural ecologists. 525
2) What are the fitness consequences of cognitive performance in the wild and what are the 526 ecological contexts under which that ability is favoured? 527
3) Are cognitive performance and/or neurocognitive processes consistent across different 528 environments for a given species? Are they consistent for a given individual if we can measure 529 cognitive abilities in the wild? 530 4) Can we create more ecologically relevant cognitive performance tasks that help link cognitive 531 abilities or brain structure to specific ecological challenges? 532 5) What environmental or social factors are associated with the evolution of specific cognitive 533 abilities or neural structures across species and what role do these abilities play in the speciation 534 process? 535 6) Are different cognitive abilities related to each other (i.e. positive correlation or trade-off)? Is 536 there compelling evidence for general intelligence in non-human animals? 537 7) Problem solving is the one "cognitive" task that has been related to fitness in wild animals. 538
However the cognitive mechanisms underlying this task remain unclear (Healy, 2012 In bi-parental breeding songbirds, choosing an appropriate mate according to available male 850 stock, previous breeding experience and actual environmental conditions is a behaviour that will 851 have drastic fitness consequences for any female and that is likely to rely on the interplay 852 between various cognitive functions. Recognition of ornaments linked to different male qualities 853 (e.g. good genes, parental care, nest defense, etc.) uses perception (visual and auditory) to detect 854 male signals and categorization to group and identify male quality according to their ornaments 855
(1). The use of previous breeding experience relies on past learning linking male ornaments and 856 reproductive success from previous experiences (2). Mate choice itself, integrates all information 857 available to the female including current ecology, mate options, and past experience supposedly 858 through decision-making mechanisms (3). Finding the chosen mate, once the decision has been 859 taken, probably relies on spatial memory to relocate the territory defended by the chosen male 
